报告人简介：
北京理工大学管理与经济学院教授，博士生导师，长期从事绿色供应链与物流管理、市场营销与运营交叉学科、大数据驱动的决策管理等领域的教学研究工作，担任International Journal of Advanced Pervasive and Ubiquitous Computing副主编、中国优选法统筹法与经济数学研究会智能决策与博弈分会常务理事、工业工程分会理事和中国自动化学会经济与管理系统专业委员会委员，受邀担任UTD24/FT50顶级期刊Production and Operations Management的编辑评审委员会委员，中国工程院院刊Frontier of Engineering Management特约通讯专家，国际知名期刊Transportation Research Part E、Annals of Operations Research、International Journal of Production Research和International Journal of Logistics Research and Applications客座编辑，长期担任Production and Operations Management、Decision Sciences、IISE Transactions、European Journal of Operational Research等30余个SCI/SSCI刊源审稿人，以第一作者或通讯作者在专业领域内顶级/重要期刊Journal of Operations Management、Decision Sciences、Naval Research Logistics、European Journal of Operational Research、IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management、International Journal of Production Economics和IEEE Transactions on Industrial Informatics、中国管理科学、管理工程学报等上发表论文50余篇。2013年入选“北京市高等学校青年英才计划”，获第三届北京市大学生物流设计大赛优秀指导教师奖。
报告摘要：
The term platform economy refers to a business practice in which online retailers (e.g., JD or Suning) serve as transaction platforms that connect upstream suppliers with downstream buyers. A supplier can employ a commission channel to sell products directly to customers by paying a fixed entry fee and a transaction-based commission fee to the online retailer. This paper investigates an online retailer’s incentive for demand information sharing with an upstream supplier who has already built a retail channel but possesses an incentive to establish a commission channel. We show that the online retailer may voluntarily disclose her private demand information with the supplier, which can generate two effects to her benefit. First, when both the competition intensity and the entry cost are low, such that the supplier is inclined to set up a commission channel, information sharing generates an efficiency effect that reduces double marginalization by helping the supplier to make more precise price and quantity decisions that can alleviate channel competition and also benefit the online retailer. Second, when the entry cost is medium, the supplier will not set up a commission channel when there is no information sharing. In this case, information sharing imposes an inducement effect on the supplier to establish a commission channel.
